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THE POLITICS OF CRIME AND THE
THREAT TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Jeannine Bell*
The “higher authority” to whom present-day capital judges may
be “too responsive” is a political climate in which judges who
covet higher office—or who merely wish to remain judges—must
constantly profess their fealty to the death penalty. Alabama
trial judges face partisan election every six years. The danger
that they will bend to political pressures when pronouncing
sentence in highly publicized capital cases is the same danger
confronted by judges beholden to King George III.
Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519 (1995) (Stevens, J. dissenting) 
The threat to judicial independence that Justice Stevens notes in his
dissent in Harris v. Alabama has recently been eliminated.  In 2002,
the Supreme Court ruled 7-2 in Ring v. Arizona1 that juries, not
judges, must make the determination that a defendant will be sen-
tenced to death.  Before the Court’s decision in Ring, judges were
ultimately responsible for sentencing in capital cases in nine states.
In these states, elected judges faced pressure to demonstrate their
support for the death penalty either by overruling a jury verdict or by
imposing it with or without a jury’s advisory opinion.  By taking the
ultimate decision regarding whether a defendant will be sentenced to
death out of the hands of the judge, Ring removed what Stevens
identified as a significant threat to state court judges’ ability to make
unfettered decisions. 
Though this particular threat to the independence of state court
judges has been eliminated, across the nation the politics of crime
still matter for state court judges, the vast majority of whom are elect-
ed.  Challenged by interest groups and opponents, state court judges
face the prospect of election defeat because of rulings they have made
in capital cases.  Governors have also criticized judges for their rul-
ings in capital cases.  The death penalty case is not the only political
stumbling block that judicial candidates have faced.  Judicial candi-
dates have often felt pressure to demonstrate to constituents that they
are not soft on crime.
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1 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
This white paper addresses factors that judges and some scholars
argue threaten the ability of state trial court and appellate judges to
make independent decisions in criminal cases.  Part I discusses the
particular issues of concern to judges who must make decisions in the
area of criminal law and the sway that the “politics of crime” holds
for elected judges.  Next, Parts II and III address two types of diffi-
culties that judges face—those that stem mainly from the fact that the
vast majority of judges must run for reelection, and those that con-
stitute more direct attempts to limit judges’ power.  The white paper
concludes in Part IV with a brief discussion of some of the conse-
quences of placing such limits on judicial power.  
Part I.  Why Criminal Law Is Different
All elected judges may be sanctioned by voters who dislike decisions
they have made while on the bench.  Increasing judicial accountability
by increasing citizens’ power to remove judges from office is one jus-
tification for this form of judicial selection.  As judicial elections
have become more politicized, elected judges have had to raise money
for their election campaigns.  Judicial elections have become increas-
ingly expensive, and judges must worry about raising money to run
election campaigns.  During the 2000 judicial elections, candidates
for state supreme court raised $45.6 million, double the figure
raised just four years earlier.2 The need to raise money presents
judges with ethical dilemmas when potential or past donors appear
before them.  
A related issue concerns the need to seek votes.  Judges may be con-
cerned that controversial decisions made on the bench will alienate
voters and donors, causing them to lose an election or to fail to raise
enough funds to mount a successful campaign.  Finally, judges may
be tempted to take policy positions to distinguish themselves from
their challengers during the campaign.  While articulating policy
positions is a valuable part of the political process for other elected
officials, promises are problematic for judges.  A judge might be
tempted to live up to her campaign promises and ignore the applica-
ble law for fear of not being re-elected.  For these reasons, making
promises or pledges are ethical violations under the American Bar
Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which most states have
adopted.3
For trial court judges who preside over criminal dockets and appellate
judges who must hear appeals in criminal cases, the politics of crime
and the public fear of crime add to other threats to judicial inde-
2 Jeannine Bell
2 Larry Bivens, Coalition Wants to Reform State Judicial Campaigns, Gannett News Service, Feb. 22, 2002.
3 Penny White, Judicial Independence: Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by the Use of Judicial Performance
Evaluations, 29 Fordham Urban L.J. 1053, 1061 (2002).
pendence.  Though it has always been a concern in America, fear of
crime increased and became a more salient issue in the late 1980s
and early 1990s for the public and in American politics.4 Though
some statistics suggested the number of actual crimes committed was
decreasing, citizens’ perception of the amount of crime increased.
From 1989-1992, a greater number of Americans indicated in polls
that they believed more crimes had occurred that year than the year
before. From 1985-1992, the number of individuals claiming to be
victims of crime more than doubled.5
In the 1980s and 1990s, politicians capitalized on fear of crime by
demonstrating that they believed in taking a serious approach to end-
ing crime—that they were tough on crime.6 One way politicians have
chosen to demonstrate that they are tough on crime is by attacking
judicial decisions. Judges who make decisions in criminal cases are
especially vulnerable.7 Fear of crime makes decisions in criminal cases
of greater interest to the public. Rulings in the defendant’s favor in
death penalty cases often serve as fodder for criticism from law-and-
order politicians. Similarly, judges in criminal cases are required to
make thousands of decisions regarding the suppression of evidence
and bail.8 While it is impossible to predict who will commit a crime
while released on bail, it is easy for politicians in hindsight to criti-
cize a judge who granted bail to the defendant who re-offends while
out on bail.9 Politicians have also chastised judges for their decisions
to suppress evidence and other rulings unfavorable to the prosecu-
tion. The sections below describe and provide examples of the myriad
ways in which judicial independence is threatened for judges who
must make decisions in criminal cases.
Part II. Election-related Challenges to Judicial Power
A. The Public, Special Interest Groups and the Death Penalty
The public interest in crime makes judges most vulnerable to attack
when they are running for election. One area of criminal justice to
which the public pays close attention is the death penalty. Public sup-
port for the death penalty, though it has recently fallen, remains
high. Two-thirds of Americans support the imposition of the death
Appendix F   3
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5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from
Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 308, 316 (May 1997).
8 Id. at 319.
9 Id.
penalty, at least in theory.10 Public support for the death penalty was
even higher in the mid-1990s when polling data showed 80 percent
of Americans supported the imposition of the death penalty and has
remained higher in some states, such as Texas, than it has in the
country as a whole.11
The high level of public support for the death penalty has meant that
judicial candidates’ views on the death penalty are often very impor-
tant. Judges’ rulings in death penalty cases and judicial candidates’
views on the death penalty have been a minefield for those facing
elections. Judges face election or retention elections in all but six of
the states that have the death penalty.12 Candidates are aware of the
likelihood of discussions of their views on the death penalty and may
try to avoid discussing the issue on the campaign trail for a variety of
reasons. For example, one candidate for a local judgeship in
California skipped a television debate because he was concerned that
his responses to questions about the death penalty and the “three-
strikes” law might violate judicial ethics rules.13 Sometimes their views
or rulings in death penalty cases prevent them from being appointed.
According one news story, legal experts contend that in an attempt to
show he is conservative, Governor Gray Davis of California has
appointed judges who enthusiastically support the death penalty.14
Davis subjected potential justices to a lengthy questionnaire regarding
their views in a variety of areas, including the death penalty.15
State court judges around the country have faced election defeat
because of rulings made in capital cases. When an interest group,
challenger, political actor, or governor publicize a judge’s behavior in
a death penalty case, generally the decision made or vote cast by the
judge favors the defendant in some way. The most damaging of these
attacks use brochures or ads that describe, in gory detail, the murder
for which the defendant received the death penalty. Voters are urged
to show their support for the death penalty or sympathy for the vic-
tims by not re-electing the judge. The legal basis for the judge’s deci-
sion is never given.
The best publicized of these attacks was leveled at Tennessee Supreme
Court Justice Penny White. In 1996, White was targeted by a pro-
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10 Jennifer L. Harry, Death Penalty Disquiet Stirs Nation, 62 Corrections Today (Dec. 1, 2000).
11 Id.
12 Stephen B. Bright and Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the
Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U.L. Rev. 760, 779 (1995). 
13 Dawson, Citing Ethics Worries, Skips Taping of TV Debate as Opponents Spar Over Experience, Metropolitan News
Company, Feb. 24, 2000.
14 Harriet Chiang, Defense Attorneys Accuse Davis of Bias in Handing Out Judgeships,  S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 21,
2000 at A1.
15 Id.
death penalty group, the Tennessee Conservative Union (TCU), after
she and four other justices on the court voted to overturn a convicted
murderer’s death sentence. White was the only justice sitting for
retention that year. TCU and the Republican Party transformed
White’s retention election into a referendum on the death penalty by
sending out flyers describing the murder in grisly detail and advising
voters that the murderer had not received punishment he deserved—
“[t]hanks to Penny White.”16 The Republicans’ brochure advised vot-
ers to vote for capital punishment by not voting for White.17 White,
who had spent just nineteen months on the court, lost her bid for
re-election. 
White is not the only judge to lose an election because of a ruling
made or a vote cast in a death penalty case. In 1992, Justice James
Robertson of the Mississippi Supreme Court lost his seat after a chal-
lenger who ran a law-and-order campaign and was supported by the
state prosecutors’ association spotlighted an opinion the judge
wrote.18 At issue was Justice Robertson’s statement that the
Constitution did not allow the death penalty for rape when the victim
survived the attack, a view consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Coker v. Georgia.19 One ad used by Robertson’s opponents
advised, “[V]ote against Robertson because he’s opposed to the death
penalty and he wants to let them all go.”20
Though the prevalence of such referenda on the death penalty is not
precisely clear, judges either faced more difficult elections or lost
their seats because of the rulings on the death penalty in Texas and in
North Carolina.21 Judicial independence in capital cases seems espe-
cially threatened in Texas. After a 1994 decision to reverse a convic-
tion in a notorious capital case, Texas Republicans responded to a
call to take over the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and the
Republicans won in every judicial election that year.22 In a similar
story—also from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals—Judge Charles
Baird was the lone dissenter in the appeal of famed death row inmate
Karla Faye Tucker.  He cites this as a reason for his defeat in the next
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18 Id. at 170.
19 Id.
20 John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study,
72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 465, 466 (1999).
21 In elections in 1986 and 1990 in North Carolina, challengers castigated Chief Justice Exum for
voting to reverse several death sentences.  Anthony Champagne, National Summit on Improving Judicial
Selection: Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1391, 1394 (June 2001).
22 Bright, supra note 7, at 320.
election.23 In recounting his experiences, Baird told of another Texas
judge, an eight-year incumbent, who granted a motion to suppress a
weapon in a capital case and was defeated in a primary election that
occurred immediately after he handed down the decision.24
B. Politicians and the Politics of the Death Penalty
Public support for the death penalty and the graphic nature of many
of the crimes for which murderers receive the death penalty make
calling attention to any of a judge’s rulings in death penalty cases that
can be construed as favorable to the defendant an especially effective
way for politicians to dramatize their own firm commitment to law
and order. State supreme court judges have drawn fire from other
elected officials—governors, state legislators and, in a few cases, can-
didates for federal office. During their 1994 election campaigns,
opponents of Senators Charles Robb, Edward Kennedy, and Diane
Feinstein castigated each for voting to confirm former Chief Justice
Rosemary Barkett of the Florida Supreme Court to a seat on the
Eleventh Circuit. At issue were Barkett’s votes to overturn death sen-
tences in several cases while she was on the Florida high court.25 For
example, one television ad for Feinstein’s opponent, Michael
Huffington, charged, “Feinstein judges let killers live after victims
died.”26
In addition to candidates for state and national office, state supreme
court justices have drawn fire from governors for their rulings in
death penalty cases. In 1986, three California supreme court justices
were defeated in retention elections after Governor George
Dukemejian withdrew his support for them because of their votes in
death penalty cases. In Florida, perhaps in response to the justices’
striking down his plan to speed up executions by limiting death
penalty appeals in 2000, Governor Jeb Bush publicly accused the
state supreme court of hurting crime victims by adding “unnecessary
delay and legal gamesmanship” in their consideration of death penal-
ty cases.27
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23 Stephen Bright, et. al, Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising Threats to Judicial Independence Preclude Due
Process in Capital Cases?, 31 Colum. Human Rts. L. Rev., 123, 153 (Fall 1999).
24 Id.
25 Though in his ads Huffington made the comparison between Justice Rosemary Barkett and former
Justice Rose Bird, it is important to note that while she was on the Florida Supreme Court, Barkett
reportedly voted to uphold more death sentences than she voted to reverse.  By contrast, between 1977
and 1986, the California Supreme Court under Rose Bird reviewed seventy-one death penalty
convictions and upheld only four death sentences.  John Culver, The Transformation of the California Supreme
Court, 1977-1997, 61 Al. L. Rev. 1461 (1998).
26 Bright, supra note 12, at 790.
27 Jo Becker & Charles Lane, Florida’s Top Court Has Been GOP Target, Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 2000. 
In Tennessee, Republican Governor Dan Sundquist opposed the
retention of White, a Democratic appointee, and promised that he
would appoint only judges who support the death penalty. In a state-
ment that dramatically illustrates gubernatorial control of the
supreme court, Sundquist reportedly said immediately after White
lost her seat, “Should a judge look over his shoulder about whether
they’re going to be thrown out of office? I hope so.”28
Voters clearly cede to governors the ability to appoint judges who the
governors believe best able to adjudicate matters before the court. In
addition, governors may believe that the voters elected them with the
mandate to carry out particular policy positions and that the best way
to do this is to select judges who are more likely to enforce the law
from the governor’s policy perspective. The actions described above
also seem to suggest that these governors assume that the state
supreme court is an extension of the governor’s mansion. In other
words, judges should make decisions in line with the governor’s poli-
cy perspective, irrespective of the law or the facts in the case.
C. Accusations of Being Soft on Crime
State court trial and appellate judges’ ability to make unfettered deci-
sions is compromised when they must be concerned about chal-
lengers accusing them of being soft on crime. Such attacks are most
troubling to judges when they focus, as they have recently, on the
judge’s actual decisions. In 1999 Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court faced a challenger who ran ads focus-
ing on her dissent in a case in which she wrote that the Wisconsin’s
sexual predator law was not constitutional. The challenger’s ads sug-
gested that if Abrahamson were re-elected, sexual predators would be
free to prey on children.29 In California, Judge Patricia Gray of the
Sonoma County Superior Court sent out brochures maintaining that
her opponent, a former public defender, defended the actions of cop
killers, violent criminals, and child molesters.30 In another case, this
time from Alabama, the Judicial Inquiry Commission charged Justice
Harold See with using ads during his 2000 campaign that accused
his opponent of being soft on drug defendants.31
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In addition to challengers, interest groups may also use media cam-
paigns during elections to criticize judge for decisions they have
made that the group believes to conflict with its views. Florida’s
Barkett serves as an excellent example. Though an analysis of
Barkett’s opinions showed that she voted with the majority of the
court more than 90 percent of the time, a variety of groups opposed
Barkett’s retention in 1992 because she was supposedly soft on crime.
Groups opposed to Barkett’s retention included the National Rifle
Association (NRA), which spent more than $30,000 opposing her.
The NRA criticized Barkett because she had not upheld enough death
sentences, despite the fact that she had voted to uphold the death
penalty in more than 200 cases since she was appointed to the court
in 1985. 
Not all of the interest groups who attempt to defeat judges because
they are soft on crime are conservative. Gay rights groups, victims’
groups, and activists who represent the black community have also
opposed judges who the groups believed did not adequately punish
criminals who committed crimes against women, gays and lesbians,
and people of color. Protests frequently occur in reaction to what the
community considers too lenient of a sentence for an offender who
has committed a high-profile crime. For instance, Soon Ja Du, a
Korean-American grocer shot and killed Latasha Harlins, an
unarmed black teenager, in 1991. The shooting, which allegedly
occurred because Du believed that Harlins had shoplifted a bottle of
orange juice, was well publicized. After newly-appointed Judge Joyce
Karlin of the Los Angeles Superior Court sentenced Soon Ja Du to
probation, the black community in Los Angeles held numerous
protests.32 Members of the African-American community filed for-
mal charges with the California Judicial Commission and demanded
Karlin’s recall.33 Karlin’s sentence was upheld on appeal, and the
effort to recall her failed. Karlin won reelection against three chal-
lengers the next year, but retired from the bench before completing
her term.
In some cases, groups organize around a particular judge who has
made a series of decisions that the groups consider unfavorable.
Women’s and gay rights groups came out against Judge David S.
Young of Utah’s Third District , accusing him of bias when gays and
women were crime victims. In 1996, Young held onto his seat by a
slim margin, but was unseated when he lost a retention election in
2002.34
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33 Id.
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Judges who are perceived as not being tough on crime may also face
opposition from prosecutors and law enforcement groups during
their reelection or retention campaigns. For example, Citizens for a
Responsible Judiciary, a group composed of police officers and state’s
attorneys organized to publicly oppose Barkett’s retention in 1992.35
In both Mississippi and Oklahoma, prosecutors have organized simi-
lar organizations to oppose judicial candidates they believe to be soft
on crime.36
Though the charge that a judge is soft on crime can and has been
used to characterize decisions made by judges from a variety of politi-
cal perspectives, the Republican Party has leveled this charge in a
number of cases at judges who are Democrats. In addition to the
takeover of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals described above, the
Republican Party has accused candidates who are Democrats of being
pro-defendant or soft on crime in several different states. In a state
where no sitting supreme court justice had been challenged in over
100 years, Justice Jean Hoefer Toal, South Carolina’s first female
justice, ran for reelection by the legislature in 1995 and was attacked
by the state Republican Party, which called her a liberal judge who was
soft on crime.37 In Michigan, the Republican Party ran television
commercials in which the word “pedophile” was quickly shown adja-
cent to the name of one Democratic appeals court judges, along with
an announcement indicating that he had voted to uphold a light sen-
tence for a pedophile.38
Part III: Direct Attempts to Limit Judicial Power
Many (though not all) of the limitations on judicial power described
above are offshoots of the process of electing judges, rather than
selecting them by appointment. Judges who face reelection are vul-
nerable to attacks by politicians, challengers, and interest groups. In
other words, any threat to the judicial independence that exists can
be viewed as one cost of the system of accountability most states have
chosen. Some view this as a fitting price for allowing citizens to have
an opportunity to be involved in electing their state’s judges.
The independence of state court judges has been also challenged in
ways which have little to do with elections. A judge’s freedom to make
decisions is compromised when judicial commissions or ethics
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boards sanction judges for having made unpopular decisions. While
it is important that judges be disciplined for unethical behavior, their
ability to make independent decisions is threatened when public out-
cry leads to charges filed against a judge, especially when the particu-
lar decision lies within the scope of the judge’s discretion. 
Perhaps the most widely reported case of a judge being sanctioned for
an unpopular decision involved Judge Howard Broadman of the
Tulare County (California) Superior Court. The California
Commission on Judicial Performance charged Broadman with willful
judicial misconduct in 1995 and 1996. At issue was Judge Broadman’s
widely publicized 1991 order that a defendant in a drug case agree to
the implantation of the birth control device Norplant as a condition
of probation. The defendant had previously lost custody of her five
children. In another very controversial case, Broadman delayed sen-
tencing of an HIV-positive rapist to investigate the possibility of
prison officials’ withholding medical treatment from the defendant.39
Though some of the charges of improper sentencing against him
were dismissed, Broadman, who was supported by the California
Judges Association, argued that the charges against him interfered
with his exercise of judicial independence.40
Removing a judge from a particular jurisdiction because of an
unpopular decision that he or she has made demonstrates a related
threat to judicial decision-making. Significant public outcry over a
particular judge’s decision can lead for calls for the judge’s removal
or transfer to another jurisdiction. Such was the case in Los Angeles
after Karlin sentenced Du, the Koren-American grocer, to proba-
tion. After the decision, Los Angeles District Attorney Ira Reiner
attempted to prevent Karlin from hearing new criminal cases by fil-
ing for affidavits of removal on all of her pending cases. In a move
that was heralded as striking a blow for judicial independence, the
head judge of the court declined to transfer Karlin to a noncriminal
court outside out of the area. This signaled a defeat for the Los
Angeles District Attorney’s office—which had succeeded in having
judges prevented in at least two earlier occasions in 1985 and 1990
from hearing criminal cases after they made decisions with which the
district attorney’s office did not agree.41
Judicial independence is directly threatened by legislation or other
actions that attempt to limit the scope or range of judicial decision
making. A relatively little known example occurred in Texas in 1989
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39 A Career Under Fire, The (S.F.) Recorder, Jan. 5, 2000.
40 Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and Judicial Independence, 61 Law & Contemp. Prob. 59, 67 (Summer
1998).
41 Lynch, supra note 32.
when the Texas District County Attorneys Association—dissatisfied
with what it believed were the liberal, pro-defendant decisions of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals—put forth a legislative proposal to
amend the Texas Constitution to restrict the court’s decisions.
Prosecutors argued that the court, an intermediate court with super-
visory authority over criminal appeals, was interpreting the Texas
Constitution in a way that gave defendants more rights than the U.S.
Constitution did. The proposed constitutional amendment, which
ultimately died in House committee, would have prevented the court
from independently construing provisions of the Texas Constitution
having to do with defendants and thus removed judges’ interpretive
independence.42
Sentencing guidelines, three-strikes law, and mandatory minima are
more commonly used legislative initiatives to limit judicial discre-
tion. Judges, who are often opposed to sentencing guidelines, argue
that guidelines requiring mandatory sentencing for particular crimes
violate the separation of powers and impede their ability to render
justice.43 One Florida judge remarked that sentencing guidelines
result “in the truly evil avoiding punishment and the technically
guilty being senselessly incarcerated more often than should be toler-
ated in a free society.”44
Three-strikes laws, which are in force in the majority of states,
require judges to impose a long sentence on any defendant guilty of
three felonies. Under California’s three-strikes laws, which were
passed in 1994, defendants with two previous convictions for violent
felonies had to receive a sentence of twenty-five years to life for their
third felony.45 This sentence is required irrespective of whether vio-
lence was used during the commission of the third felony. A second
strike requires a doubling of the normal sentence. Judges complain
that these types of laws comprise judicial independence by taking the
power away from judges to decide whether the defendant should been
shown mercy or if rehabilitation is possible and would serve the pub-
lic interest more than meting out a long sentence. The California
Supreme Court agreed and handed down a controversial decision in
1996, which indicated that three-strikes laws limit judicial discretion
and in doing so violate the separation of powers.46 In that decision,
judges were given the power to dismiss felonies if there is a low likeli-
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hood of the defendant committing further crimes.47 The California
Supreme Court further expanded judicial discretion the following
year when it decided that judges had broad authority to reduce felony
convictions in crimes that were “wobblers,” crimes such as petty theft
that are nonviolent felonies.48 In the event of wobblers, judges were
given the authority to reduce the third conviction to a misdemeanor
conviction, thereby avoiding the three-strikes law.
Part IV. Conclusion: Consequences of Politicization 
All of the actions described above—criticism of judges’ decision by the
public, interest groups, prosecutors, challengers, and governors;
sanctions issued to judges; and legislative attempts to limit judges’
power to decide cases have changed the judicial landscape. The most
obvious change is the politicization of campaigns has made judicial
campaigns much more expensive, forcing judges to raise large sums
of money to defend themselves against attacks. 
Judges may also find it harder to keep their seats. Even if a judge is
able to comment on a decision that is being scrutinized, he or she
may have a hard time defending his or her actions. In the area of
criminal law, judges who are responsible for sentencing make many
decisions, often with incomplete information. If a defendant out on
bail commits a crime, the judge may find it particularly difficult to
defend his or her decision to grant bail. Judges who are accused of
letting violent killers go free are frequently defeated at the polls
because the crimes for which defendants are sentenced to death are
often grisly and the procedural protections on which judges base
their decision may seem inadequate to the public. 
Judges and some scholars believe that the message the defeat sends to
judges who remain constitutes an even more significant threat to
judicial independence. They argue defeat of a judge who lost because
he or she was targeted by a governor, interest group, or challenger for
making an unpopular, yet legally defensible, decision suggests to all
the remaining judges and judicial candidates that if one is to remain
a judge, policy preferences must guide decision-making rather than
the law.
Politicization of crime may have led some judges who are eager to
keep their seats to inject politics into the race by dramatizing their
12 Jeannine Bell
47 Maura Dolan, Court Widens Judges’ Leeway on Three Strikes, L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1997.
48 Id.
records49 or by accusing their opponents of opposing the death
penalty.50 Judge Mike McCormick of the Alabama Tenth Circuit
Criminal Court ran advertisements during his re-election campaign
bragging: “Some complain that he’s too tough on criminals, and he
is.…We need him now more than ever.”51 In an attempt to appear
tough on crime, candidates have also made promises regarding future
conduct—a clear violation of judicial ethics rules. One candidate for
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Judge John Devine of the
Harris County Civil District Court, announced his candidacy by
declaring that he believed in “being short on words but long on sen-
tences.”52 Another candidate for the same court promised during her
campaign that if elected she would never vote to reverse in a capital
murder case.53
The politicization of the death penalty and other criminal justice
issues may have had an impact on how judges make decisions. The
independence on the judiciary is limited if judges are more likely to
make particular decisions because they feel that their tenure would be
threatened if they were to decide otherwise. Several types of evi-
dence—anecdotal evidence showing that particular judges have ful-
filled campaign promises never to reverse death sentences, studies of
death penalty relief rates after politicization, and surveys of judicial
attitudes—suggest that the politicization of criminal justice issues and
attaching consequences to unpopular rulings affect judicial decision
making.
Researchers have attempted to evaluate systematically the degree to
which judges feel pressured to vote to uphold death sentences. Using
data that compared appellate reversal rates before and after events in
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which the death penalty was highly politicized, John Blume and
Theodore Eisenberg found that in California, Tennessee, and South
Carolina, politics did have an impact on outcomes in death penalty
cases.54 In California, the event was the removal of Chief Justice Rose
Bird; in Tennessee, the event was the removal of White. In South
Carolina, the focal event was the pro-death penalty campaign of the
state’s attorney general. In each of these three states, the authors
found a statistically significant decrease in reversal rates following
these highly politicized pro-death penalty events.55 The authors cau-
tioned that politicization might not affect reversal rates in all states,
however. Data from Texas and Mississippi did not show decreases in
relief rates following highly publicized pro-death penalty events.56
A third measure of the impact of the politicization on appellate and
trial courts is the way judges feel about making unpopular decisions.
There is some evidence that judges—and not necessarily judges who
make decisions in the area of criminal law—feel the affect of politi-
cization of their jobs. For instance, one recent study of Florida
judges by the League of Women Voters found that close to 95 percent
of the judges surveyed indicated they are conscious of the conse-
quences that will follow from an unpopular ruling; a quarter of the
respondents said this happens frequently.57 Though the judges denied
that being aware of the consequences affects their ruling, the vast
majority, some 83 percent, indicated that they believed that their col-
leagues were affected by the consequences. As a reason for their con-
cerns, judges in the survey cited recent attacks on courts and the like-
lihood that they would not be re-elected.58 Even if the survey is cor-
rect and the knowledge that some decisions may have negative conse-
quences does not affect a judge’s final decision, the survey revealed
that at least some judges behave differently when they are worried
how a decision will be received. Some judges insisted they often
spend more time drafting an opinion or order they fear will be
unpopular.59
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